Abstract
The criminalization of cartels implies that leniency policy, as an Antitrust Law’s enforcement tool, must also find a justification in the criminal sphere. Here it is argued that this justification is linked to the purposes of Criminal Law, an assumption that has various practical consequences, some of which are developed in this work.References
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